It is a new point of view from which Capt A. T. MAHAN of the United States Navy has undertaken to study an interesting period of modern history. Hitherto the bearing of naval resources and operations on the course and outcome of international rivalries and contests been indistinctly or inadequately indicated. General historians, not being professional seamen, and aware of their inability to discuss intelligently naval strategy and tactics, have been disposed to treat maritime encounters in a cursory way, while the compilers of naval annals have devoted themselves rather to technical exposition and critielsm than to the demonstration of the effect of maritime ascendency on the issue of wars, Capt, hishan's aim, on the other hand, is, as the title of his book announces, to trace The Influence of Sea Power upon History, and he has selected as particularly adapted to his purpose the period from 1660 to 1783, which beheld the irretrievable decline of the Dutch naval power. the decay followed by vigorous attempts at resuscitation of the French and Spanish navies. and the gradual advance of England to preponderance upon the ocean. The reason assigned by the author for the limits of his review is that these roughly define the epoch of sailing ships, distinguished from gaileys on the one hand and from steamships on the other, One cannot but wish, however, that the author could have found room for a preliminary chapter on the naval triumphs of England under Cromwell, and also for supplemental chapters dealing with the exploits of Jervis, Nelson, and Collingwood. But it will scarcely be disputed that within the field to which he has chosen to confine himself, Capt. Mahan has demonstrated the important influence and sometimes decisive weight of maritime power in the scale of war. If he does not succeed in persuading us that fleets played a controlling part in the war of the Spanish succession, he easily convinces us that to the temporary preponderance of the French in the Chesapeake was due the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. We may note, before pass ing to a more congenial duty, that the author s occasionally guilty of a minor historical oversight, which does not affect, however, the soundness of his conclusions. For instance, writing of the epoch between 1660 and 1783 he continually speaks of the Emperor of Austria. There was, of course, no such personage before 1804. Again, speaking of the state of Europe in 1660. Capt. Mahan says: "Prussia, as now known, did not exist. The foundations of the future kingdom were then being prepared by the Elector of Brandenburg." course Prussia, as it is known in 1890, did not then exist, but the Electors of Brandenburg

Before entering on his specific task Capt Mahan examines the part played by naval forces at certain momentous crises in ancient and medieval times. The battle of Actium, for instance, is commonly regarded as decisive of the contest be ween Augustus and Antony. Had Antony, however, been willing to put bimself at the head of his land forces, he had at least a chance of retrieving his maritime re-The importance of the battle of Lepanto has also been overrated; it was but a short time after what seemed an overwhelming defeat that the Turks sent forth a new fleet, stronger than any naval force which the Christians could array against them. It was the preponderance of Venice in the Adriatic during the sixty years between the fall of Constantinople and the inordinate development of the Spanish power that barred the Ottoman advance into Italy and central Europe. There is much. other hand, to be said on behalf of Capt. Mahan's theory that the success of the Romans in the second Punic war was due in no small measure to their preponderance at sea. It is obvious, indeed, that Hasdrubal, when he set forth to relieve his brother Hannibal, would not have met disaster on the Metaurus could he have transported his troops by water instead of being forced to take the long, circultous, and difficult land route. The author does not convince us, however, that the part of the Mediterranean lying between Carthage and Tarentum was not sufficiently open to permit of Hannibal's being repeatedly reenforced from Africa. Some reenforcements he did gain from that quarter, and that these were not more adequate to his necessities was due less to the Roman preponderance at sea than to jealousy and incompetence on the part of Carthagenian officials. It is, nevertheless, true, as Capt. Mahan points out that Carthage, failing herself to support her General. Hannibal's base of operations was the military power controlled by his family in Spain, and that his line of communication was cut by the Roman mastery of the tract of sea lying between Italy and Spain. To what extent can the study of naval his-

had been Dukes of Prussia since 1618.

tory in the epoch of sailing vessels be made instructive to those who have to reckon with the changed conditions of maritime warfare in our time? To this question Capt. Mahan rehistory in this direction, for the reason that steam navies have as yet made no history | ern Confederacy. whose reaching can be accepted as distinct and this is as yet unattainable in the annals of , mail. armored vessels propelled by steam. Ihas, indeed, been argued that for usef analogies we should look, not to experience of sailing ships, but to the bil Cr of galleys propelled by oars. It is out that the galley and steamer he mon feature in the ability to move 1 3 82 5 arecgalley and the steamer. The motive power of the former, when in action, rapidly declines, human strength being Incapable of long sus-Consequently, in the case of the galley, tactical movements could continue only for a limited time. Again, during the galley period. offensive wespons were not only of short range, but almost wholly confined to not agree with those naval writers who doem a hand-to-hand mêleé, such invariably occurred in an engagement between galleys, the necessary outcome of modern naval weapons. He believes, on the contrary, that the more self-confidence an Admiral possesses, and the finer the tactical capacity of his fleet is known to be, the more reluctant will be show himself to enter a melce in | her which his tactical advantage would be thrown away. The author also reminds us that the easily familiarize themselves with power of injuring an enemy from a great distance, and of managuvring for an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men. is common to the sailing vessel and the steamer; and this he considers quite as important from the view-point of tacties as the power of a galler to move in a calm or against the wind. le Moreover the "weather gage," an advantage indispensable to a salling vessel contemplating an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong than an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong an aggressive movement, has, in the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the case of the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of strong that the red to develop our reserve of the red to develop our reserve an aggressive movement, has, in the same history thor finds, however, in our national steamships, an analogue in superforit pointed and in our past history, a warrant for besteamships, and in our past history, a warrant for besteamships. steamenipe, an arrange purposes, a Ao a co. sur and in our past mistory, a speed. For tactical purposes, a Ao a co. sur and in our past mistory, a speed speed. For tactical purposes, a Ao a co. sur and in our past mistory, a speed speed any d. lieving that if legislative hindrances were respeed. For the greater speed any A be said to have the weathwhere #80 its adversary. While, thereformit dant. Mahan does not profess to be able to dollect tactical precedents from the performances of sailing ships, he believes that tactical principies lany be acquoed from their experience. It may be at all events conceded that, whatever may be said of tactics, the rules of naval strategy, as bearing on the ultimate outcome of international contests, are essentially the same, whether the instruments of maritime warfare are sailing ships or steamships. Throughout this volume the author is careful to distinguish between tactics, or the move-

a fleet on a fleid of battle when in contact with the enemy, or at least within eye-shot of him, and strategy, or those plans and movements which precede actual contact, and have

tattle of Tratalgar is an instance of the use-

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r their scope the whole theatre of war. The resources in maintaining an armed navy of a

fulness of studying the strategy of a past era. The precise manner in which Nelson won battle may be without significance to those who have to deal with new weapons and a new propelling power; it may even be open to some criticism from the view-point of Nelson's contemporaries. The strategy, on the other hand, which brought Nelson's ve-sels into Spanish waters at the right moment, after twice crossing the Atlantic in chase of the French Admiral will always remain a memorable lesson. It was, in truth, the triumph of this strategy, and not its concrete outcome at Trafalgar, which caused Napoleon to abandon the hope of invading England and to break up his camp at Boulogne. It was in August, 1805, when Villeneuve. fn despair of reaching Brest, turned back to Cadiz and not in October, when the French and Spanish fleets were beaten-that the plans of Napoleon were irremediably shattered.

II. One of the most interesting chapters of this book is devoted to the discussion of the principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations. These conditions are geographical position, physical conformation (including natural productions and climate), extent of territory, number of population, character of the people, and character of the Government and national institutions. As regards geographi-cal position, the author scarcely needs to point out that England possessed a great advantage over her chief rival maritime rivals, Holland and France, in that she was neither forced to defend herself by land, nor tempted to seek extension of territory by land. Holland's strength was exhausted by the necessity of defending land frontier, while the resources of France were squandered in a ceaseless effort to gain accessions of territory at the expense of Germany and Italy. In another particular the British Islands had the advantage over France. The fact that the latter country oorders on the Mediterranean, as well as on the ocean, while favorable to the pursuit of commerce, has been a source of military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, and this passage could seldom be effected without risking, if not incurring, heavy loss. The author of this volume thinks that the analogous position of the United States upon the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous expense had we a large sea commerce on both coasts. A consideration of special interest to Ameri

cans is the relation which geographical nearness to the object of attack bears to the effectiveness of privateering, or the commerce-destroying operations of cruisers. Having ports on the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic, and also such havens of refuge as Martinione and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean the French cruisers started from points near the foct of English trade. Capt. Mahan reminds us that the necessity of renewing coal makes the cruiser even more dependent on its port at the present day than it was formerly. The United States have no ports very near the great avenues of foreign maritime trade, and unless she could find bases of operation in the ports of an ally, her position would be singularly disadvantageous for successfully pursuing a commerce-destroying war. The importance of another matter upon which the author touches is likely to be recognized before many years are over. We refer to the geo-graphical position of the United States relaively to a Central American canal. It is certain that along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interest of the great European nations into close proximity to our shores. Our position with reference to this new route will resemble that of England to the British Channel, as that of Italy to the Suez waterway. Or rather from our coign of vantage at Key West we shall be about as near to the Trans-1sthmian Canal as the English at Cyprus are to Port Said. As our distance, however, from the Isthmus, though less than that of the European nations, is still considerable. the author thinks that the United States will have to obtain in the Caribbean stations fit for contingent or secondary bases of operations. As regards physical conformation, it is mani-

fest that numerous and deep harbors are sources of commercial wealth, especially if they are the outlets of navigable streams. But Capt. Mahan points out that by their very accessibility they become sources of weakness in war, if not properly defended. Thus the Dutch. in 1667, found little difficulty in ascending the Thames, and burning a large fraction of the English navy, within sight of London. On the other hand, a few years later, the combined fleets of England and France, when attempting a landing in Holland, were the power of Spain was presently enlisted on the french side. It is well known that this Graves at New York. Rodney himself, how-1814 the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of Washington taught us how much danger may be insurred through undefended waterways. Again, in our civil war, the feeble defences of the mouth of the Mississippi, and the number of its subsidiary streams | to resuscitate the French power in India. This plies that we must needs seek the lessons of penetrating the country, made that river a source of weakness and disaster to the South-

As to mere extent of sea coast, the author positive. To the record of sailing ships we holds that this is a source of strength or weakmust look for experimental knowledge, since ness according as the population is large or In the war of secession, for example, ad the South possessed a people as numerous is it was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources, the great extent of its sea coast and its numerous inlets would have been elements of strength. Under such conditions an effective blockade of the whole Southern coast would have been impossible. As it tion, independently of the wind to f as the sailing ship could follow only s to d non-ships were entering, and paralysis prevailed ber of courses when the wind to and had to in regions which under other circumstances remain motionless when it failed. There are might have enabled the Confederacy to supprofound differences, however, between the port the burdens of the war. It is Capt. Mahan's opinion that never did sea power play a more

decisive part than in the war of the rebellion. In considering the effect of population on taining the exhausting efforts demanded, sea power one must look of course not to the hand to hand encounter. Capt. Mahan the population of France was much greater

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and the importance of the associated interest. | attack upon Savannah, and then sailed for More important even than the size of a pavy at a given crisis is the provision for a rapid development of it in time of war by an adequate reserve of men and ships, and by measures tending to draw out the general reserve power

of the nation. Summing up the situation of the United States with relation to sea power, the author maintains that it has only one of the three indispensable constituents. It has a large surplus of products for export, but it possesses neither a merchant navy nor stations for the coaling and repairing of its vessels in distant seas. It is indeed open to dispute whether, notwithstanding such disabilities, we could now suffer such disasters as were incurred in the wars between France and England. The principle that the flag covers the goods is firmly established. It is by no means certain, however what England might insist upon as constituting a blockade technically effective; she might hold that a dozen fast steamers. cruising twenty miles off shore between New Jersey and Long Island, would seriously endanger ships seeking to enter the bay of New York. She might maintain the same view of a blockade's efficiency with reference to Boaton, the Delaware, and the Chesa-peake. It is true that commerce in neutral ships would still find it possible to enter other ports of the United States, but the author of this volnme dwells with emphasis on the dislocation of the carrying traffic of the country which would be necessarily involved in such a forced change of ports of entry. Besides, when new entrepots had been agreed upon by neutral nations, it would merely be needful for England to stop the new, as she already had the old.

Whether an American navy is attainable without a previous or concurrent restoration of our merchant shipping is. in the opinion of Capt. Mahan, doubtful. It is true that a navy was built up under such circumstances by Colbert when permitted to wield the despotic powers of Louis XIV., but experience showed that this navy was like a growth which, having no root, withers away. Even had the United States a great national shipping, the author thinks it doubtful whether a sufficient navy would follow. The distance which separates us from other great powers, though in one way a protection, is also a snare. Capt. Mahan can see but one motive strong enough to impel the United States to the creation of a powerful navy. That motive will for the first time be presented when a canal has pierced the American isthmus.

HII.

In that part of his book which deals with the forty years following 1660, the author finds it easy to demonstrate that the sea power of England had, upon the whole, a weighty influence upon the Issue of International contests. It played, for instance, an important part in the wars which ended respectively with the peace of Nimeguen (1678) and the peace of Ryswick (1697). We are unable to credit it. owever, with a decisive effect on the war of the Spanish Succession, which ended with the peace of Utrecht (1713). It is true that, in the last-named conflict, the command of the sea enabled the English to land troops in Portugal and Catelonia, but they and their Austrian allies were ultimately driven by the French from the Iberian Peninsula. It was not the English navy, but Marlborough in the Low Countries, that humbled Louis XIV, and forced alm to submit to mortifying terms of peace. There is no doubt, on the other hand, that the rôle of the English navy in the Seven Years' War was a momentous one. It was England's complete ascendancy at sea which deprived France of her colonial empire in North America and of some of the most valuable of her West Indian possessions, and which led to the capture of Havana and the Philippine Islands from the Spaniards. Only in the case of the failure to relieve Minorca did the navy fail to justify the confidence of the English people, and Admiral Byng, the unfortunate

ommander of that expedition paid for his

silure with his life. We should add that it was

which rendered possible the triumphs of Clive

in India, and brought about the ruin of the

French power in that country. When we re-

auxiliaries of any consequence except Prussia and Hanover, was opposed to France, Spain,

Austria, and Russia, the extent of the conquests

IV.

achieved through her mastery of the ocean seems almost incredible.

We have followed with especial interest the contest grew out of our own Revolutionary ever, attributed the loss of the colonies to the war, and that, through the temporary preponderance of the French in American waters, it had a decisive bearing on the outcome of that struggle. A feature of this war less familiar to | Mahan seems to consider Rodney right. Americans is the gallant effort made by Suffren war between England and the house of Bourbon may be looked upon as purely maritime. and it is noteworthy for the fact that, unlike the contests which preceded and which followed, it ostensibly resulted in the woful discomfiture of England. Capt. Mahan has devoted five chapters to this interesting topic, and he has brought out more clearly than any of the general historians the effect of sea power on the final issue. The situation which confronted England at the outbreak of this war was materially different from that in which she had found herself at previous crises. In the first place, the thirteen American colonies were hostile instead of being friendly. and therefore constituted a constant drain upon England's resources, besides supplying her enemies with havens of refuge and repair. In central Europe France had no enemies, decisive part than in the word the relection.

In considering the effect of population on sea power one must look of course not to the grand total, but to the number of people following the sea, or at feast variable for each of the sea of the sea variable for each of the word of the ware following the Pronch Revolution, the population of France was much greater than that of England; but the lister country could draw upon a much larger number of the seaffing of the lister country could draw upon a much larger number of seaffaring mean and shiperights. The author of the seaffaring the lister country could draw upon a much larger number of seaffaring mean and shiperights. The author of the seaffaring mean and shiperights. The author of the seaffaring nonline of naval warfare such reserves its conditions of naval warfare and reserves its conditions. It is a sea of the seaffaring the and was thus without preoccupation on the land side. Moreover, the French navy was in a state of remarkable preparation as com-

France, leaving the Americans worse off than they were before an alliance with France was concluded, for the English now acquired a mastery of Georgia and South Carolina. In the next year (1780) the command of the French fleet in American waters was given to Count de Guichen, and that of the English fleet to the celebrated Rodney. After several in decisive engagements between the two Admirals. De Guichen sailed for France, and the American colonists saw nothing of the French fleet that year, if we except seven ships of the line under De Ternay, which had convoyed the troops under beau. It will be noticed that during the first three years after the alliance was concluded the French naval officers attended almost exclusively to their country's interests in the West Indies, and rendered scarcely any service to the Americans. It may, indeed, be ques tioned whether the French and Spanish Governments wished to secure American inde pendence until they had turned the embarrassment of England to their own advantage. In the spring of 1781, however. De Grasse ar peared in the West Indies with twenty-five ships of the line, but missed an opportunity of beating the English Admiral Hood, who had but eighteen vessels, some of which, moreover, were badly damaged. Meanwhile, in March of the same year, an engagement took place off the capes of the Chesapeake between French and English squadrons, each of which numbered eight ships, though in this case the English had the heavier armament. Nevertheless, the latter got the worst of the battle; but, with buildog tenacity, managed to carry out the purthey pose of their expedition, which was to save Benedict Arnold from capture in Virginia. It was in compliance with urgent letter from Rochambeau and Washington that De Grasse, in August, 1781, set sail with every available vessel from the Caribean. and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the capes of the Chesapeake, with twenty-eight ships of the line, which, a few days later, were strengthened by the arrival of a French squadren from Newport, comprising eight ships of the line and four frigates. In the interval. however. De Grasse had repulsed the attack of Admiral Graves, who had but nineteen line-of-battle ships. The return of Graves to New York put an end to Cornwallis's hope of succor, and compelled the surrender of Yorktown. In the letter written by Washington to De Grasse on the day after the capitulation he did not hesitate to attribute the honor of the surrender to the French Admiral. The latter would not stay, however, to finish the work, although, as Washington told Lafayette in November of the same year, the British force in the Carolinas and Georgia might have been extirnated if Comte de Grassa could have extended his cooperation two

months longer. The year 1782 was marked by England's loss of Port Mahon, and the successful defence of Gibraltar against the combined fleets of France and Spain, comprehending fifty line-of-battle ships, besides forty gunboats and ten floating batteries. In February of the same year De Grasse, with thirty-three ships of the line, allowed the English Admiral, Hood, with twentytwo ships, to e-cape him, but he executed his original plan of taking the island of St. Chrisopher. How grave a blunder had been committed in allowing Hood to evade an encounter was manifest two months later, when Rodney, arriving with reinforcements, raised the English fleet to thirty-seven ships of the line. In the so-called battle of the Saints, which took place on April 12, 1782, between Rodney and De Grasse, the latter, who was slightly outnumbered, lost five ships, including his own. This is regarded by the author as the greatest naval battle that had been fought in a century. Its influence on the course of events was not confined to the prevention of a Franco-Spanish attack upon Jamaica, but materially affected the terms of peace subsequently agreed upon between England and the allies. We are also reminded England's maritime superiority at this time | that this battle was distinguished for a manœuvre afterward practised by Nelson, but then looked upon as exceptionally daring-the man ruvre known as breaking the line. Rodect that, in that contest. England, with no ney struck and shattered the French line of battle in two places by columns of his own ships ranged in such close order as to force the vessels of the enemy aside. According to Capt. Mahan, however, this celebrated stroke was due, not to previous intention, but to a shift of wind that threw the French ships out of order and so widened the gaps between them. The author agrees, also, with those critics who think that Rodney failed to follow up his adauthor's study of the war which broke out in vantage with adequate vigor. Nor should it be 1778 between England and France, and in forgotten that Rodney has been held primarily which, through the so-called family compact. responsible for the surrender of Cornwallis, beevacuation of Rhode Island and the excessive extension of the English lines through the in vasion of the Carolinas. On this point Capt.

The maritime fighting in East Indian waters was on a relatively small scale, the largest force which Suffren at any time commanded force which Suffren at any time commanded being the fifteen line-of-battle ships which he had at his disposal in his fifth and declsive battle in June 1783. Although his opponent, Hughes had eighteen ships the French Admirst was the assailant. Indeed, the characteristic of Suffren was his refusal to adopt the defensive tactics, which had been traditional in the French navy for half a century. It seems undisputed that Suffren was the greatest of French seamen, and one of the ablest sea commanders known to history. He died suddenly in 1785; had he lived he would have been but 77 years old at the date of the Dattle of Trafalgar, and but 70 when the battle of the Nile was fought. Nelson would have found in Suffren a very different antagonist from Bruers was fought. Nelson would have found in Suf-fren a very different antagonist from Bruers or Villeneuve. Yet even Suffren had reason to complain that the Captains and crews of his ships were decidedly inferior to their English opponents.

M. W. H.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NEW JERSEY. The Coast Line Receding a Rod or More Every Year.

POEMS WORTH READING. His Decoration.

From the Judge He walked by her side author strolled apart, Through the lonely blescoming ways, Afar from the bugges and rouling drains. The psain of a nation s praise; Afar from the crowds that timzered there 'Mid the sunit graves and the headstones fain-They, too, with the rewarent through ad bent, and in dear remembrance crowned with palms and lauren and garrants bright Full many a grass-crown monad; and heard the voices of communes tell flow muchy the heroes rought and felt.

But now, in silence, they turned away
Through mendows with daisies apread:
Her face was grave, but her eyes were sweet
With the insurer of lears inside.
And she ich a rose to her finger tips.
Red as her own soft rose red lips. "You were kind to the dend," he said at last,
In a pleading minred tone.

But what of the thing solder brave,
Who in daily fight alone
Must strive for stur nor dream of fame:
Dare he no token of honor claim." She turned with a smile half tears, and placed Her rose on his bosom. "There, My one last flower: It was meant for you. But, I was not sure you -would -care. We give, unsought, to the noble dead. But the noble living must say," she said. Madming S. Emiguez.

Not a Cheerful View of It. Prom the Boston Globs.
Wealth and glory, place and power.
What are they worth to me or you!
For the lease of life rish out in an hour.
And death stands ready to claim his due
Bounding honor- or heaps of god.
What are they all when all is told. A pain or a pleasure, a smile or a tear, what does it matter what we claim? For we size from the cradle into the bing. And a careless world goes on the same. Hours of pladness or hours of sorrow. What does it matter to us to morrow?

Truth of love or yow of friend.
Tender caresses or cruel sucers.
What do they matter to us in the end!
For the brief day dies and the long night ness
Passionate kissus or tears of gail.
The grave will open and cover them all. Homeless varrant, or honored guest, Poor and humble, or rich and great, All are racked with the world a unrest, All must meet with the common fata. Life from childhood till we are old. What is it all when all is told?

ELLA WHERLER WILCOX The Land of Used-To-Bo. From the Mint

Prom the Minneapolis Journal
Beyond the purple, hasy trees
Of Summer's union though the seas.
Beyond the rands heyond the seas.
Beyond the rands heyond the seas.
Beyond the rands of the seas.
The land of Used to be.

A land enchanted, such as swing In golden seas when stress cliting Aloog tief dripping trinks, and sing To Jasen in that mystic tongue. That thated mer with its melody; Oh, such a land, with such a sea Kissing its shores eternally, Is the fair Used to be.

A land where rausic ever sirids
The air with belts of singing birds.
And sows all sounds with such sweet words
That even in the lowing herds
A meaning fives so sweet to me.
Lost lausither ripples limpidly
From higs brimned o er with all the glee
Of rare old Used to be. Lost laughter and the whistled tunes of boyhood's month of creacent runes. Their counted through long afternoons. To sevenading plentinues. When sarilicht fell eo mistily. That, peering up from bended knee, I dreamed twas bridal drapery. Hung over Used to be.

Oh, land of love and dreamy thoughts, And shiming fields and shady spots, Of coolest greenest greamy plots. Embossed with wild forget me nots, And all the blooms that cunningly Littlefraces up to me. Out of the past; I kiw in thee

Hove yeall, and with weteyes
Turned glimmeringly on the skies.

My blessings like your performer rise,
Till over my soul a stience lies.
Sweeter than any sour to me,
Sweeter than any send to me,
Guita sweet cohe, yea, all three;
My drams of Used-to-bel JAMES WRITTOOMS RILEY.

The Ballad of Ye Olde Cheshire Cheese From the Academy

A home of antique case and peace There is, within the city's pale; A spot wherein the spirit sees Old London through a thinner veil. The modern world, so s iff and state, You leave behind you, when you please, For long clay pipes and great old ale, And becfsteass in the Cheshire Cheese. Beneath this board Burke's. Gold mith's, kness were often thrust, so rous the tale:
Twas here the Poster took his case,
And wielded speech that, like a fail.
Thrashed out the golden truth. All hall
Great souls that sat on nights like these,
Till morning mads the candide pale.
And revellers left the Cheshire Cheese!

By kindy sense and old decrees
Of England's nee they set their sall;
We press to never furrow decas;
For vision-worlds we breast the gale;
And still we seek and still we fall.
For still the glorious phantom flees!
Ab well no phant ms are the sie
And bedsteats of the Cheshirs Cheese.

If doubts or debts thy soul assail,
if fashion's forms its ourrent freeze,
Try a ong pipe a glass of ale,
And supper in the Cheshire Cheese. T. W. ROLLESTON

From the Philadelphia Inquirer George W is my Christian name, climpson is my sur:
I am not a soldier's widow,
And I never went to war.
I am not the head of the families,
The baby is in command, My wife is next in order.
If you're married, you'll understand, My color is white on week days; On Sundays I feel blue. I was married in 1450. And my age is thirty-two I was born away down in Texas, At a place called Esukakee. My father was born in scottand, On the banks of the bonny Dee. 'Twas there he met my muther, who was also born close by. Which is my excuss for living. And will be tit! I do. I never have been naturalized; By trad-I am a too! I am working at it steadily, and I do not go to school.

I do not read—the Bible.
And I never write—a check;
I can swear in chinest Ebusish.
With a bod upon my beck
I have measurphalits.
I'm not a homeless child;
I served one day in prison.
Then I was rather witd.

I ren: the house I live in: Will I take a drink? You bet Beauty in the Poke,

How much I admire the bewitching pake bonnet Which half hides the rosectian boom in the face! Why, a unid. I know, both his throne there upon it Concealed in the trimming of mult or of lace. The style isn't new for our grantimothers were it.

And they were not wanting in beauty or grave.
Their grand daughters love it the young mus adore it.
The charming pute bonnet that shade a sweet face.
The ravishing bonnet, the expusite bonnet.
Hewildering bonnet that shades a sweet face.

The fair shapely head is half hidden within it.

And part of the beautiful face disappears:
How often I've kiesed the lips glowing warm in it.
The while its course fibres were licking my ears! Away with the hat with the feathers upon it. Within my affection twill he er have a place.
Ohi give me the multitimized, the coarse straw pound.
The ravishing bound that shades her sweet face.

MONEY MAKING IN COLLEGE,

You Can Sell Books and Cigars and Write snays if You Have the Head For It. When Mr. Carnegie expressed his opinion about the injury of a college education to a young man's business ability, he did not realize the way in which business enterprise shows tself in the biggest colleges of the country. Bus ness enterprise has not the same scope in a small college that it has in a big college, just as it has not the same scope in a small town as it has in a big city. In Yaie, Harvard, and Princeton the number of young men who work their way through college is increasing every year, and not only that, but some of them work their way through and make a profit by it. In every class there are now to be found a few young men who make from \$1,000 to \$4,000 a year in the eight and one-half months of the college course. This is more than most of thom make for several years after leaving college, and, from a financial point of view, I

rear occasionally and extend their course. Every aunual catalogue of a college contains summary of expenses, which is usually misleading. The summary gives what the man who gets out the catalogue thinks is a fair estimate of the expenses of the students. The man who gets out the catalogue usually graduated some time before the war, and he does not recognize the changes that have come in college life in the last ten years. At the time when he went through college there were only two ways of going through, by paying the expenses with one's own or one's father's money. or by taking the beneficial aid of the college and by working during the vacations. Students then who worked their way through dropped out occasionally and taught school and worked on a farm during the summer.

would be profitable for them to drop back a

The expenses in a college like Yale are given at \$340 a year for the lowest, \$630 a year for the general average, and \$1,050 for very liberal. Not one man in a hundred can go through college on \$340 a year and pay all his bills. To do that he would have to wear throughout the course the same clothes with which he went in, and he would have no social pleasures or enjoyment except those provided at some one else's expense. The items, as given officially in this low estimate, are: For the college treasurer's bills, \$155; rent and care of half a room. \$15: board for thirty-seven weeks, \$110; furniture, the average of a half room for four years, \$10; fuel and light, \$15; washing, \$15; text books and stationery, \$10, and sundries, \$10. The text books and stationery are very

low, and the sundries are almost infinitesimal. For the general average, as officially given, the Treasurer's bills amount to the same; the room rent is incressed to \$75 the board to \$200, the furniture and fuel to \$20 each, the washing to \$25, text books and stationery to \$30; subscriptions to college associations, athletics, and papers, \$30, and sundries \$75.

For the liberal allowance the Treasurer's bills are the same; rent. \$110; board, \$300; u:niture, \$50; fuel and light, \$28; washing, \$12; text books and stationery, \$50; subscriptions, \$100; private servant, \$25, sundries, \$190, These items are misleading to parents, who often fix their sons' allowances by them, and do not understand it when their sons spend more money than the catalogue says. Each class collects its own statistics about the expenditure of its members. These statistics show that the average expense is a little over

\$1,000, which the college puts down as very liberal. Many fathers start off by having their sons give them an itemized account of their expenses. This seldom lasts through the course, though it causes family disturbances and many explanations, some false. The facts are that the only accurate things in the list are the Trensurer's bills, the rent, and steam heat. The catalogue oddly enough assumes that a man who is going through college cheaply will have fewer clothes in the wash than the man who is not. There will possibly be some difference, but there is no reason why a man who is trying to save money

wash than the man who is not. There will possibly be some difference, but there is no reason why a man who is trying to save money should have only one-third as many clean ality. He such gest the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as live. He such gest the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books it is hard to see how—the set can cost five times as the cover of the regular text books and statute of the students with an in-stitution of learning, it is doubtfull if he could exist on a dime a day. He was the regular text because the seen had for the regular text by the set of the regular text by the set of the regular text by the set of the regular text by the reg

trade. He knows sooner than the local dealers what books and instruments will be needed, and he can gange more accurately the sumply to the deman! He knows whom to trust and what price to make. A college book and stationers store, with 1,000 or 1,500 students buying their supplies from it. Will make a haudsome profit. If with the store is joined a clear stand, seda-water fountain, and an accept for the sale of athletic coods, the proprietor's profits are limited only by his business skill, for he has a demand of \$75,000 or \$100,000 a year to supply. In overy college fown, like Princeton. New Haven, or Cambridge, there are several dealers in a third goods, many clear stands and a number of book stores. A college man with a business head can go into any of these businesses just as well as the outsiders, with the advantage that he knows the character of the trade and has a personal acquaintance with his oustomers.

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The White Lifty.

The white Lifty.

The white Lifty.

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side work. A bright man who is not trying for prizes in college may go through with an expenditure on the average of five or six hours' time a day. There is nothing to preven his working the rest of the time. He may put in an eight or a ten hour day and attend his resitations fairly well. In ease the college town is part of a city, like Boston or New Haven, a college man has as many fields of Industry order to him as any other man, besides those teld about above, though it must be said, as bearing out Mr. Ca negle to an extent, that the men who are successful business men in college, are not much more successful outside than their follow students, it is frequently the case that a man with apparently no business sense, ability, or energy in college wakes up afterward and surpasses the num who during his college mas as it does anywhere cless. side work. A bright man who is not frying for ws itself in college just as it does any-

TITLES AND THEIR LIFE.

Carlone Facts About the Way Person and United Judge, Colonet, and so on,

It is curious how some titles cling to peo and how others are seldem used or almost at once apandened. A man who has served a term in a State Senate is always called Senator, a member of the Board of Aldermen is always called Alderman: but an Assemblyman is seldom catled Assemblyman after his term has expired, and a Congressman is more likely to be called Judge. For just why a Congressman is called Judge we must go back to the time when almost all Congressmen were lawyers and when many of them were Judges before they became Congressmen. It is a bigger thing in New York now to be a Judge than a Congressman; there was a time when it was not,

It is much the same with military titles. A Major is always a Major unless he becomes a Colonel. A Captain does not stay Captain, but is usually promoted to Major or Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonels are called Colonel. A Colonel and General by brevet, who has a right to be called General, is more likely to be called Colonel. There is a certain popularity about certain of these military titles which applies them to people without due right or discrimination, while other titles which are their due lapsa. Comparatively few veterans of the war are called Lieutenant. Some are called Sergeant, and they seem to be proud of the title. Very few are called Corporal. The Colonels and Majors are the most popular. Well-known Generals are of course called General, but Colonels who had the commands of a General are usually called Colonel, though Captains who have commanded a regiment are generally called Colonel. There is a certain feeling of locality about

the State they incline more to Majors. In Connacticut the Coloneis predominate. The prevalence of Colonels is somewhat accounted for by the Governors' staffs. Each Governor appoints a number of Colonels and a few Generais on his staff. The Colonels are usually young men of social prominence and of family standing, who are willing to pay the cost of the uniforms, and to spend what is necessary to keep up the dignity and social qualities of their office. They are Colonels forever afterward.

A military title seems to swallow up a civil title, except the title of Judge, which is a fair opponent to any military title. A man who has been in the State Senate, and is a Colonel or General, is called Colonel or General instead of Senator. Col. Michael C. Muroby is an example of this. Gen. Barnum is another example. This does not apply to Captains. Several State Senators have been Captains, but they are called Senators and not Captains. The title renator seems also to prevail over Major. Senator Chase is a Major, but he is usually called Senator. This seems to show a greater vitality in the title of Colonel than in any other military title. A title of office even occasionally overcomes General. It is seldom, however, that an official title overcomes the military title of Colonel. Even the title of Governor is not proof against a military title. It may last while the man is yet in office, but it does not last when he is out. If he is a General, his military title revives and will predominate.

Those titles do not last according to their rank. The title of Mayor does not endure during the heitime of its possessor, while the title of Alderman does. So does the title of Judge, even if the Judge were nothing more than a filler-in of an unexpired term in a minor court. The titles of Comprisioner does, Commissioner is a broad generic name, which can cover aimost anything. It applies equally to a Commissioner of the Brooklyn Bridge, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Works, and a Commissioner of ether known offices do not.

It is a general rule in the use of titles that a deputy or assistant is entitled to the fail title without the prefix of denuty or assistant. A ais on his staff. The Colonels are usually young men of social prominence and of family

this. New York city runs more to Colonels; up

A NEW OUTDOOR GAME. A Sort of Tennis, Called Crooketta,